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Abstract – We describe a fault-tolerant architecture
designed to enhance commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
device-based space-system reliability, and to provide
automated system recovery, in the presence of radiationinduced functional errors. The architecture is primarily
aimed at cost-effective “small satellite” systems, where
very limited mass, volume and power resources preclude
the use of multiple-redundant system-based architectures.
Our architecture is based on the concept of a fast data
network interlinking all units of the data handling
subsystem to an intelligent supervisor node. The
supervisor monitors status messages from the units and
intervenes when the state of a unit does not match
expectations or messages stop arriving. In such an event,
the supervisor attempts to identify the nature of the fault
and to recover the unit accordingly. Thus, this approach is
flexible enough to support the fault-tolerant strategy
deemed most suitable for the devices under consideration,
given their failure modes and operating environments.

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary design considerations for a space
mission is the survivability of its electronic systems in an
ionizing radiation environment.
In the past, “rad-hard” technology derived from
military programmes dominated the space industry.
However, the decline in the availability of such
technology and the trend towards ever more complex
space missions has led to an increasing consideration of
the use of state-of-the-art commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) microelectronics for the construction of
spacecraft systems. This is particularly the case at
Surrey, where the design construction and operation of
cost-effective “small satellite” missions typically
requires the extensive use of current COTS technology
to enable the spacecraft to achieve significant
functionality in very severe power, mass, volume and
cost constraints.
The use of modern COTS technology brings new
issues with regard to system reliability in the space
environment. By its very nature, COTS technology is

constantly changing. One of the most significant trends
is the move towards smaller dimensions – i.e. “scaling”.
Scaling has some benefits for radiation effects resilience:
As gate oxide thicknesses decrease, hole trapping and
interface trap build-up are becoming less significant,
leading to a trend toward improved total-ionising dose
(TID) performance [1,2]. Similarly, the increasing use of
buried epitaxial substrates over the last 20 years [3,4]
has helped decrease single-event latch-up (SEL)
sensitivity – both by limiting the charge-collection
volume, and by decreasing the substrate series resistance
[5,6,7]. In addition, the concomitant trend towards
reduced supply voltage levels suggests that device
threshold voltages should soon fall below that required
to sustain latch-up. Indeed, if continued scaling forces
the industry to adopt silicon-on-insulator (SOI)
technology, latch-up should soon be eliminated [1,4].
However, whilst some radiation effects are becoming
less of an issue, new threats have emerged:
Another significant trend in COTS technology is
move towards the use of “smart” logic, in device
architectures, e.g. advanced memories, complex microcontrollers and field-programmable gate arrays
(FPGAs), etc. Here the performance of the logic device
requires the inclusion of complex control circuitry
internal to the die. Whilst transparent to the user, such
circuitry may offer a significant target to ionising
particles and thus be prone to single-event effects
(SEEs), such as a single-event upset (SEU) or singleevent transient (SET). In such circuitry, these can
manifest themselves as single event functional interrupts
(SEFIs), whereby the device exhibits an unexpected
change in its observable output state [8].
SEU in external memory is relatively easily mitigated
by use of appropriate error-detection and correction
(EDAC) coding strategies [9]. SET in external logic can
similarly be dealt with by careful attention to system
design and clocking circuits [10]. However such events
internal to complex device structures remain a problem.
One approach is to build-in mitigation at device level
(e.g. through the use of triple-modular redundancy
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within the device [11]) – however, this approach is
rarely available in true “COTS” components. Instead, we
must adopt a mitigation strategy that accepts that SEFIs
can (and probably will) occur at device level, and design
our systems accordingly.
The use of “n”-level redundancy, and “lock-step”
processing remain powerful tools to mitigate such effects
at system level [12], but the additional system overheads
these methods entail (in terms of volume, mass and
power) are always a problem in spaceflight. Indeed, they
are particularly so in the context of the “micro/nano”space systems designed at Surrey, where the entire
spacecraft are typically only a few 10’s of kg in mass.
Also, it is worth mentioning that for longer spacecraft
mission time frames, lockstep conditions for commercial
devices must be well thought out. In particular, the TID
degradation of the commercial devices must be
examined for clock skew with increasing dosage. This
may potentially cause "false" triggers if any device
responds to dosage even slightly differently.
Instead, we propose a system architecture solution,
where a single intelligent supervisor is added into the
data-handling network. This monitors all the spacecraft
systems and checks for unexpected changes or loss in
functionality. This supervisor holds set-up and
configuration data for the systems under its control, and
it is continuously made aware of their current state by
means of status messages passed to it by the systems.
Should an anomaly occur, the supervisor attempts to
determine the nature of the fault and apply the
appropriate recovery procedure. In this way, the
supervisor acts as a kind of intelligent “operator in the
sky”, enabling autonomous recovery without the need
for immediate ground intervention. Because of the
question of “who guards the guards” the supervisor itself
must be radiation-hardened – but this is not onerous
given that it is a single unit which does not have to
perform other processor intensive tasks. All the other
sub-systems on the OBDH network can be advanced
COTS based.
To offer an “intelligent” mitigation strategy, we must
be aware of the nature of SEFIs in the device types under
consideration and their signatures:

II. FUNCTIONAL INTERRUPTS IN TYPICAL COTS
DATA HANDLING DEVICES
A. Memories
With regard to SEFIs, floating-gate memories and
DRAMs are of particular concern.
With floating gate memory technology, every bit is
represented by a metal oxide semiconductor (MOS)
transistor with two gates – the normal MOS gate, and the

“floating” gate, which is surrounded by high-impedance
insulating material. Charge stored on this floating gate
represents the bit state, and this remains even if the
device is powered-down. The technology may be used to
construct electrically erasable programmable read-only
memory (EEPROM) or so-called “flash” memory.
In EEPROM devices, electrical erasure of individual
stored bits is made possible by applying a voltage of the
opposite polarity to the charging voltage to the nonfloating gate. Large EEPROMs allow erasing only in
fixed-size blocks, typically 128K-bits – 512K-bits at a
time, hence making the erasure process faster. These are
called “flash” memories.
In contrast to the read operation, writing to floating
gate memories is a slow process. Therefore, in order to
provide improved performance, flash devices are
organized in blocks and pages. An embedded state
machine is used to control the flow of data to-and-from
the device and this uses page buffers to hold data
temporarily during any read/write operation. It also
issues internal commands and controls sequencing to
perform read, write or erase operations. Some enhanced
devices also include the ability to queue a sequence of
commands and provide automatic power saving features
– all of which requires internal control logic.
Flash devices can be operated in different modes and
the visibility of internal changes caused by radiation
effects depends on the way that the part is used [13,14].
Radiation testing of these devices has revealed their
high susceptibility to SEFIs. Table I summarizes SEFI
signatures that have been observed in flash memories
along with proposed recovery procedures [13,15,16].
A dynamic random access memory (DRAM) cell
stores information on a tiny capacitor accessed through a
MOS transistor. Refresh cycles are used to update every
memory cell periodically. In order to make the
refreshing task simple and manageable, DRAMs are
organized in two-dimensional arrays (i.e. cells are
organised in rows and columns). Larger DRAMs often
have multiple arrays and this eases the electrical and
physical design problems that would otherwise occur
with an extremely large array. Another advantage of
multiple arrays is the parallelism that can be achieved,
enabling a modern DRAM controller to perform several
operations at once. For example, it can complete a write
operation in one array whilst initiating a read operation
in another, thus increasing the effective throughput of
the memory [17]. Again this requires internal logic.
The existence of SEFI in DRAMs was first reported
in 1996, where during irradiation, a DRAM device was
observed to enter its test/standby mode [18]. Reading the
device during this mode results in an unexpectedly high
“upset” rate. The device tested in this example was a
Samsung 16Mbit DRAM. Similar signatures were
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observed during irradiation of an Oki Semi 4Mbit
DRAM [8].
TABLE I
SEFIS IN FLASH MEMORIES
SEFI Type

Manufacturer

Read operation locked
into an endless loop,
with an increase in
supply current
Read operation locked

AeroFlex

Write operation locked
Row/column changes:
Large portions of the
memory array change
state
Block-erase: the device
is stuck in a “busy”
state
Partial-erase: the device
requires repeated erase
commands for one or
more blocks

Recovery
Method
Power cycling

AeroFlex,
Toshiba,
SanDisk, Intel,
Samsung
Intel, Samsung
Intel

Repeat the read
process or
cycle power

AeroFlex,
Toshiba,
SanDisk, Intel,
Samsung
AeroFlex,
Toshiba,
SanDisk, Intel

Power cycling

Power cycling
Power cycling

Repeat the
erase operation

DRAM SEFIs were first observed in orbit in a 12
Gbit solid-state data recorder (SSDR) installed on the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) [19]. As with many
DRAM devices, the HST DRAMs include redundant
memory rows and columns. When the device is powered
up, weak rows/columns (i.e. those where the data
retention of the cells is suspect) or bad rows/columns
(i.e. those where bits are always incorrect) are replaced
with redundant ones, as appropriate. An internal
redundancy latch holds the device configuration. It is
believed that upset in this logic element led to the
observed “block” SEFIs, caused by correct
columns/rows being replaced by bad or week ones.
Makihara also reports block SEFIs in NEC 16 Mbit
DRAMs [20]. The author suggests that these errors
might be due to upsets in the control circuitry turning on
the gates of access transistors before the bit lines are precharged, resulting in unknown data being stored into the
cells.
Synchronous
DRAM
(SDRAM)
technology
represents the state of the art in high density, volatile
memory. These devices have internal state machines to
provide pipelines, programmable refresh modes and
power control states, etc. A mode register is included on
chip, which is used to define the device operation.

Usually the mode register is configured once, when
the device is powered-up. This register has been found to
be susceptible to SEE in some devices [21,22].
Particular bit combinations in the mode register are
not defined or are reserved for future use. Thus, by
producing one of these patterns, a single particle-strike
can result in complete loss of functionality of the device
until the device is reset or, in some cases, until power is
cycled.
In a SDRAM, the memory array is divided into two
or more banks. This allows one bank to be pre-charged
whilst the other is being accessed. The resulting
parallelism in operations can provide improved
throughput. However, a SEU in the control circuit can
cause block errors when the active bank information is
lost [21].
Row-based errors have also been observed [22].
Typically, a large number of errors were seen in
sequential rows, i.e. several rows that were next to each
other are seen to have a similar number of errors.
Several types of the “logic” SEFIs are also observed,
sometimes accompanied by an increase in standby
current of approximately 0.5mA to 2mA.
In most of cases, a device can be recovered from a
SEFI by reinitializing affected device and rewriting its
mode register. Probability of SEFIs occurrence can also
be reduced by periodically rewriting its mode
register[23,24].

B. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)
There is growing interest in the use of reprogrammable FPGA technology for space missions.
SEUs in these devices can be grouped into three
categories [25]:
Configuration upsets are defined as the upsets in the
configuration memory of the device and can be detected
by read-back. The likelihood of failure will depend upon
the upset location and the specific design utilisation of
the device resources. It is reported that on average 6.5
configuration upsets are required to produce a functional
failure in a device with no mitigation at all [26]. A
configuration upset can sometimes lead to high current
states. For example, a SEU may cause two output drivers
to be connected together [27].
User logic upsets represent upsets in the circuit
elements that are not directly accessible by read-back.
The effect of these is dependent upon the particular
logical design implemented by the user.
Architectural upsets are those upsets that occur in the
control circuitry of the FPGA. As an example, it is
possible for a single upset in the configuration control
circuitry to change many configuration bits
simultaneously [26]. This kind of anomaly can only be
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detected by noting the malfunction of the device.
Mattsson reports such an event, whereby all shift
registers are disabled at the same time. The device
requires a reset and complete reconfiguration for
recovery [28].

C. Microprocessors
Microprocessors are often sensitive to SEUs, which
can occur in any basic element of the processor
including the program counter, the sequence controller,
the registers, and the arithmetic logic unit (ALU), etc.
Depending on time and location of the upset, it may
manifest itself as a calculation error or a SEFI caused by
alteration of control or address bits. In many cases, the
error occurs in unused elements and thus has no
observable consequences.
Errors have been observed where the processor
simply resets itself or stops functioning altogether. The
latter is called “lock-up” SEFI (or simply lock-up) [8].
Hence, a microprocessor SEFI may cause the processor
to lockup, reset, have continuous exceptions, execute its
standby mode, or go into some unknown state.

D. Data Handling Networks
Commercial data handling networks are becoming of
increasing interest for space missions. For instance,
European space agency (ESA)/European space research
and technology centre (ESTEC) program European
cooperation on space standards (ECSS) has
recommended IEEE 1355 (SpaceWire), whilst national
aeronautics and space administration (NASA)/jet
propulsion laboratory (JPL) X2000 program has adopted
the IEEE 1394 (FireWire) network standard.
Results on radiation testing of both spacewire and
firewire have been published in Ref[29, 30, 31].
Broadly, errors can be divided into two categories: soft
errors, which do not disrupt data transmission across the
network and hard errors or SEFIs, which stop
communication and are most likely to be caused by an
upset in protocol registers or control logic. Chau et al.
describes the most common or critical failure modes for
spacecraft data handling buses, which are being
identified by JPL/NASA [32] and are summarized below
•
Invalid Packets: These are the packets, which
have invalid data.
•
Non-Responsive packets: An anticipated
response to a message does not occur before it
times-out.
•
Babbling: Communication among nodes is
blocked or interrupted by uncontrolled data stream.
•
Conflict of Node Addresses: More than one
node has the same identification.

Buchner and Rodriguez presents their results of pulsed
laser testing of an Atmel ASIC chip, which was used to
generate the spacewire interface. Three types of errors
were observed:
• data errors alone
• loss of link alone
• data errors together with loss of link
Recovery involved restarting of the protocol software.
One SEFI was observed, which required power reboot of
the network [31].

III. SYSTEM LEVEL MITIGATION OF FUNCTIONAL
INTERRUPTS

SEFI’s, then, are an inherent feature of the types of
COTS devices we would wish to use to construct costeffective and capable space systems. Whilst device
cross-sections are usually relatively low, and thus such
errors are not expected to occur all that frequently in the
space environment, none-the-less the consequences of
SEFIs are important for system reliability.
In contrast to traditional single-event upsets (SEUs),
where faulty bit can be isolated and corrected, SEFIs
occur in the sensitive cross-section of the device to
which the user has no direct access or has minimal
information about device architecture. Therefore, the
exact location of the fault in the device is unknown and
it can only be detected by the noted malfunction of the
affected device. This implies that each module in the
data handling architecture should be provided with some
kind of intelligent monitor to detect SEFI like signatures
as quickly as possible. However, providing this at
module level is undesirable as:
• it will require at least one radiation hardened
core within each module;
• potentially, a major design modification would
be required on each module.
We therefore propose an architecture whereby all
systems are linked to a fast data bus, which is itself
linked to an intelligent “supervisor” module. The
supervisor requires fast communication to and from the
underlying devices to track their activities. We exploit
the fact that there is already a move towards adaptation
of fast data handling networks for space missions. A
multi-level fault protection technique has already been
demonstrated by Chau et. al [32] to provide high speed
data handling for highly reliable space systems. This
brings the opportunity to centralize the desired
intelligence and autonomy into one rad-hard unit to
supervise the on-board data handling architecture. This
technique is a generic solution for providing fault
tolerance in a data handling architecture, which is
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heavily based on commercial components and standards.
However, it will be particularly useful for small satellites
because of low overheads associated with this approach.
Thus, the purpose of this work is to investigate
feasibility of an on-board intelligent supervisory system
to detect and recover from gross failures, such as SEFIs
in an otherwise COTS-module-based spacecraft data
handling architecture.
System availability requirements address extreme
events leading to possible loss of mission as well as less
severe events, which might require ground station.
Usually small satellites require ground-intervention to
recover from events like SEFIs, resulting in long
downtimes. An intelligent on-board operator is desirable
for future missions in order to meet increasing demand
of maximum system availability.
Also, this approach promises high adaptability and
reusability. The target system will be able to provide a
nominal operation without the supervisor node, if the
mission does not require achieving a certain level of
reliability and availability. On the other hand, inclusion
of the supervisor node will lead to increased reliability
and autonomy with minimum ground intervention. The
overheads associated with this approach come in the
form of the level of complexity of the software running
on the supervisor and network traffic, which can always
be traded according to the mission requirements, even
without making any change to the system hardware.
Therefore, it promises a measurable increase in small
satellite utility across range of mission performance
requirements.

IV. EXAMPLE DATA HANDLING ARCHITECTURE
An example architecture based on the proposed
principle is shown in Figure 1. Each system links to the
network via an interface gate-array, which also provides
for local monitoring and mitigation of radiation effects.
In principle, the data network could be any reasonably
fast bus, however, we favour the use of the newlyemerging SpaceWire (modified IEEE 1355) network
technology [33].

JPL have similarly identified SpaceWire, along with
the IEEE 1394 FireWire to be of interest for their X2000
COTS-technology based data handling architecture [34].
SpaceWire is a full-duplex serial point-to-point
network, in which nodes are interconnected by routingswitches. The SpaceWire standard defines six layers of
protocol: physical, signal, character, exchange, packet
and network. It provides a coherent interface to
processors, mass memory units and sensors etc. Whilst
there are similarities to the IEEE 1394 bus standard at
the physical layer, the higher layers of the SpaceWire
protocol are much simplified in comparison. This makes
implementation easier (a basic SpaceWire link can be
implemented in 5000 gates), acceptable overheads on
even smaller packets (<35%), but it does preclude some
useful functions – such as the ability to support
broadcast or multicast.
The spacewire standard describes the hardware and
software necessary for implementation of the protocol.
The standard includes useful fault tolerance features
such as parity checks, link disconnect error detection and
recovery, escape sequence error, credit error, empty
packet error, exception end of packet received and
destination address error. It also specifies a very small
underlying bit error rate, being less than 10-14, which
means one error every 11.5 days at 100Mbps. However,
radiation response including SEUs and total dose effects
would depend on the protocol implementation chips. For
instance, an Atmel ASIC-based spacewire router is
reported to have a total dose performance of 300krad,
and SEU and latchup immunity up to 100MeV[35].
In our proposed implementation, the network is used
for sending status messages, diagnostic commands and
blocks of data (e.g. payload data) between systems. A
separate Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is used to
provide a redundant command and configuration control
function. The system topology is shown in Figure 1.

A. The SpaceWire Network
SpaceWire provides for very fast data transfer (a
minimum of 2 Mbps, with a capability up to 155 Mbps
using low voltage differential signal (LVDS) drivers) at
low power (~5mW/Mbps @ 100Mbps), scalable, i.e.
network bandwidth can be increased by adding nodes,
and provides a high degree of isolation between systems
– avoiding problems such as powering up from
interconnections between systems etc.

Fig. 1. Example OBDH Architecture
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The data handling network is vital to success of a
space mission. Therefore it should be sufficiently
radiation tolerant. Actel Corporation offers two classes
of rad-hard FPGAs, RH1020 and RH1280 with
equivalent gate densities of 2,000 and 8,000
respectively. These products are latchup immune and
can withstand total dose in excess of 300Krads (Si). Its
SEU performance is predicted to be 10-6 upsets per bitday in a 90% worst-case geosynchronous earth orbit.
Actel proposes mitigation techniques to improve SEU
performance of these devices by incorporating triplemodular redundancy (TMR) or by avoiding flip-flops in
the sequential modules [36]. Adaptation of one of these
techniques is recommended for critical design sections.
Another rad-hard FPGA RHAX250-S is to be
launched in a couple of years [37]. This device
technology offers a gate count of 250, 000 with even
better radiation performance.
In addition to these rad-hard products, Actel offers
radiation tolerant devices such as RTAX_S. This device
technology has TID response comparable to RH1020
and RH1280 devices, and latchup and SEU immunity to
104 and 60MeV-cm2/mg respectively [38].
Depending on mission requirements, a rad-hard or
rad-tolerant FPGA could be adopted to act as the
interface FPGA. Implementation of the supervisor will
be discussed in proceeding section.

B. The System Nodes
The systems shown provide the core OBDH functions
of the spacecraft, and comprise different device
technologies. For example, the on-board computer
(OBC) (Figure 2) is based around a commercial microcontroller, and has built-in program storage memory
protected by a hardware-EDAC coding scheme such as
the (16,8) double-bit error correcting code used on
previous Surrey spacecraft.

processor and ultimately, it can power-cycle the entire
OBC via its link to the power system controller (Figure
3.)

Fig. 3. The Power System Node

The code store (Figure 4) will be based on floating
gate memory and will hold the back-up code, and the
operating system for the OBC, as well as other critical
data such as the current state of the spacecraft’s systems,
and the configurations for any reconfigurable FPGAs.
The supervisor will use this information to recover
the spacecraft from system malfunction, e.g. by rebooting the OBC or payload computer, resetting device
configurations, and setting the state of control variables
based on their last known good state.
Because of the critical role that the code store will
play in any system recovery, TMR is used within this
system to guard against SEFIs in the floating gate
memories. Given the small physical size and low power
consumption of the Flash devices, this is not onerous in
terms of system resources. Indeed, the TMR voting logic
may well be implemented directly in the interface
FPGA.
The flash memory cells can suffer from loss of charge
when subjected to heavy ion irradiations [39]. The
memories will be periodically checked for errors. If the
upset rate is higher than a threshold value, it will be
treated as a SEFI event, the supervisor can cycle the
power to the affected memory and restore its contents.
For the upsets lower than a threshold, correct data will
be written to the corrupted cells. Keeping record of the
erroneous locations can further increase detection
performance of the system. This is because of the reason
that an affected flash memory cell can again discharge
itself because of the radiation-induced traps in floating
gate oxide [30]. In this case, a permanently damaged cell
would require to be removed from logical memory map.

Fig. 2. The On-Board Computer (OBC) System Node

The interface FPGA will “wash” the memory to
prevent the accumulation of bit errors, and error statistics
will be gathered for passing on to the external supervisor
module. The supervisor can monitor and recover the
OBC via the interface FPGA, which has access to the
memory and processor. If necessary, it can reset the

Fig. 4. The Code Store Node

The payload computer uses a reconfigurable staticRAM (SRAM)-based FPGA for its processing element
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(Figure 5). This allows the payload computer’s hardware
to be optimised to match the particular requirements of
the payload at any given time. The configuration data for
the FPGA will be stored locally in non-volatile ferroelectric RAM (FRAM), with a copy held in the code
store. The FPGA processor will have its own in-built
EDAC circuit for protecting the program memory, and
again error-rate statistics will be made available to the
external supervisor via the interface FPGA. The
interface FPGA will be responsible for read-back to
check for configuration errors under direction from the
supervisor.

continue to operate with a reasonable reliability because
of the mitigations adopted within each module for down
time of the supervisor. In a worst case scenario, an
exception in the supervisor can lead to false triggering of
the fault conditions on one or more modules. In order to
cope with this possible failure mode, the supervisor will
be provided with a threshold of recovery attempts to
each underlying module, once it reaches that threshold
the corresponding program will go into sleep state until
ground intervention restarts it. However, this situation is
not likely to occur very often.

Fig 7 Supervisor Node
Fig. 5. The Payload Computer Node

SSDR0 and SSDR1 represent a pair of solid-state
data recorders, comprising DRAM or SDRAM devices.
The memories will be organised in banks with separate
power switches, so that in the event that power has to be
cycled through a device, only a proportion of data will
be lost.
As with previous Surrey satellites, these bulk
memories will be protected by Reed-Solomon EDAC
codes (Figure 6). Again error rate statistics will be
gathered by the interface FPGA.

Fig. 6. A Solid-State Data Recorder Node

The Supervisor
The supervisor is the key to this architecture. It
provides the functions of system monitor/fault detection,
fault diagnosis, and system recovery.
It is important then that the supervisor is robust
against radiation effects (Figure 7). A rad-hard
microprocessor will be adopted to act as an intelligent
supervisor. Probability of getting a functional interrupt
in the supervisor node will therefore be quite low.
Inclusion of watchdog timers will ensure recovery of the
supervisor from functional interrupts, if any occurs.
Nevertheless, the supervisor’s role is merely a
monitoring entity. The data handling architecture will

Current Protecting Power Switch (CPPS)
As devices are likely to experience changes in their
current consumption when affected by a SEFI, it is
desirable to provide current monitoring and protection.
Next to spacewire interface FPGA, CPPS forms part of
the interface node on each module.

V.

SUPERVSIORY FUNCTIONS

It is important to note that the supervisor will be
monitoring sub-systems with different classes of device
– e.g. microprocessors, DRAMs, floating gate memories,
FPGAs etc. - which may all exhibit several different
signatures as the result of a SEFI. For example, a SEFI
in a microprocessor may cause it to “hang”, reset, have
continuous exceptions, execute its standby mode, or go
into some unknown, unrecognizable state. DRAMs, may
show block errors or the execution of undefined states.
Floating gate memories can have a wide range of
signatures including repeated errors in the same word, all
address locations in error, read or write operations
entering an endless loop, large arrays of memory
changing state, etc. and FPGAs have a similar complex
set of signatures. In addition, supply-current variations
may be seen in all these devices.
Recovery strategies will also be different in each
case, and the priority accorded to different signatures
might also differ. For example, if a device halts with a
sharp increase in current, this might indicate that device
has entered a potentially damaging micro-latch state and
in this case immediate power cycling through the
affected device may be required.
This all implies that the supervisor should have
sufficient intelligence and adaptability to change the
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fault tolerance strategy dynamically based on the device
type, failure mode, and the operating environment
(figure 8).

Fig. 8. Supervisor Inputs and Output

VI. MONITORING/ FAULT DETECTION
The system nodes are either intelligent (containing a
microprocessor within the module) or non intelligent
(memory units). The supervisor consists of a set of
programs, one corresponding to each subsystem. We
have adopted user datagram protocol (UDP) to access a
particular program. We favour use of the open standard
rather than custom implementation as it offers seamless
interconnectivity between spacecraft and ground, ease of
implementation, increased error protection and promotes
compatibility of interfaces.
Intelligent Nodes
The supervisor must offer intelligent monitoring of
the systems on the network. It does this by keeping track
of the tasks running in any of the systems attached to the
network. As soon as a system begins a task, it will send a
“start-of-task” packet to the supervisor.
Idea of this packet is that it will contain information
about the specific task running on the machine, any
diagnostic data, which can indicate health of the
machine, any state data, which can be useful for
recovering state of the machine as close as possible to
the one prior to fault event. This information will depend
on the machine under consideration and tasks performed
by it. This proposal is based on the fact that SEFIs
detection requires careful monitoring of the device
behaviour and its recovery usually involves resetting and
power cycling of the affected device and therefore it is
important to have any state data. It emphasizes the fact
that the designer should carefully choose parameters to
reflect the true behaviour of the device. This paper
presents example parameters for an OBC unit.
Considering
a
typical
multiprogramming
environment, where all the software including the
operating system is organized into a number of
processes that can execute in parallel. Each process is
loaded into EDAC protected memory as a separate
executable file. One of the processes will be a special
process. This process will copy contents of the program
memory into code store at a location, known to the

supervisor. Typically, an operating system allows each
process to run for (10-100) ms before switching to the
next process. Considering a total of 20 processes, and a
round robin scheduling scheme, this process will update
state of the OBC every (0.2-2)s Even with a prioritybased scheduling scheme, this statistics will remain more
or less the same. As most of the processes are run with
the same priority to avoid situations where some
processes will never be executed.
The interface FPGA receives a start of task marker,
every time a process is switched from the ready to the
running state. The interface FPGA packetises it and
sends it to the supervisor. The packet format is shown in
the Fig 9.
System
ID

Packet Task
Length ID

Flags

Diagnostic
Health Data

Fig 9 The Packet Format

System ID informs the supervisor that is it a packet
from the OBC processor or from the OBC interface
FPGA. Task ID is ID of the task currently running on the
OBC. Diagnostic health data (DHD) contains the EDAC
error count. If it was a test task, it will hold results from
that. The packet also includes a screech flag. A screech
is a report of an unusual error or fatal program trap from
the operating system running on the OBC machine.
Summary of the flags field is presented in the table II.
Table II
Description of the Flags field

Flags
Bit 0
Bit 1
Bit 2
Bit 3

Description
I am okay packet
Screech packet
SEU count to be found in DHD field
Test task results are to be found in DHD filed

The current protection circuitry is set to a default
threshold current value, when it receives the start of task
marker from the OBC.
The
supervisor
software
consists
of
a
detection/diagnostic and recovery program for each
underlying module. Each program is further divided into
two parts corresponding to module itself and its interface
FPGA. The detection/diagnostic table entries for the
OBC module are shown in the Fig 10.
Task
ID

Current
Consumption

Diagnostic
Data

Health

Storage
Screech
Packets

for

Figure 10 Parameters Corresponding to the OBC Module
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The designer is required to provide a maximum
possible current consumption corresponding to each
process. Once, the supervisor receives a packet it sends
back a packet to the interface FPGA with a threshold
current value. After receiving this packet, the interface
FPGA changes default current threshold in current
protection circuitry to this new value.
The supervisor will expect to receive next start of
task packet before it times-out (100ms + an additive
factor corresponding to network delays). If the message
is not received and the timer times-out then the
supervisor will begin its error-recovery procedure for the
OBC.
A similar approach can be adopted for payload
computer. A packet time-out/non responsive FPGA will
be indicative of an architectural upset or configuration
upsets. Mismatch of test program results can be caused
by configuration or user logic upsets. Critical section of
user logic can be guarded by periodically reading back
for comparison with stored values or by periodically
rewriting these values.
Non-Intelligent Nodes
For systems that lack a processor (and therefore are
not naturally executing tasks), or for idle systems, the
interfaces themselves will run a system-monitoring task,
involving, for example, the washing of memories to
establish SEU-rates, etc. The supervisor will periodically
poll the SSDRs to collect these error rates and will use
these to detect a SEFI event.
For instance, Guertin et al presents dynamic SEFI
detection and recovery for ground testing of
Hynix/Hyundai SDRAMs devices. They define a SEFI
as an event when n out of N bits in a memory region are
in error. They have calculated a n:N ratio of 0.375, i.e a
SEFI is declared when 96 out of 256 bits are in error or
348 in 1024 and so on [24].
While calculating a threshold for a space mission, one
needs to take into account orbit and environment, which
is to be encountered by the spacecraft.
Network Considerations
Fault tolerance in data handling network forms an
integral requirement for success of this approach. And
therefore need to be taken into account. Section II D
describes most common failure modes of data handling
networks. This paper suggests possible remedies in
context of this example architecture.
The supervisory approach expects all units/modules
on the bus to periodically communicate to the
supervisor. The supervisor waits for packets from
intelligent nodes and it polls non intelligent nodes. Any
communication on the SpaceWire requires both source
and destination to perform hand shaking before sending

any data. In addition, both ends are required to send
nulls to keep the link alive during a communication
session (when no useful data is being transferred).
Therefore, SpaceWire is capable of detecting if any of
the source or destination got disconnected for any
reason. Active end tries to re-establish the link. If it
cannot, it disconnects itself from that link. It can be
programmed to report application layer of any problem
encountered. In this way, the supervisor will know, if
any of the nodes is not responding. If a node other than
the supervisor detects a non-responding node (including
non-responding supervisor node), it will send node ID to
the supervisor on CAN bus. So that the supervisor can
initiate a recovery procedure on the non-responding
node.
SpaceWire can detect parity error, escape sequence
error, credit error, empty packet error, exception end of
packet received and destination address error.
Adaptation of IP/UDP standard further increases error
check by inclusion of checksums. Therefore, any invalid
packet can be discarded.
A babbling node is a situation where a node sends out
small packets in an infinite loop in order to check for
some information such as status reports. Babbling can
lead to uncontrollable data stream in a bus network and
can cause congestion at router in a router-based
architecture. The first line of defense against anomalies
like babbling and two nodes appearing with same
address will be the inherent behaviour of the supervisory
approach. Both of these anomalies are like to affect
packet traffic to/from the supervisor.
For instance, if the supervisor does not receive an “I
am okay” packet from the OBC and it times out, it will
first poll the interface FPGA. If it cannot get connected
to the interface FPGA, it will be considered as nonresponding node, babbling or two nodes appearing with
same address anomalies. And the supervisor will start its
diagnostic and recovery on this node via CAN bus.
Also, packets more than expected from a node within
a given time slot or packets with unexpected lengths can
also be treated as fault indications.
Network Delays
The SpaceWire standard specifies a maximum delay of
5µs for 10 bits at a speed of 2Mbps [40], leading to a
maximum delay of 5µs for 500bits, which is determined
to be maximum possible length of a packet from the
OBC to the supervisor, at a speed of 100Mbps. The
SpaceWire standard does not specify any arbitration
scheme for the router. It can be round robin, priority or
weighted priority etc. For the system-level supervisory
approach, a priority-based arbitration can assure that a
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timer in the supervisor will not time out because of
routing delays.
Environment Monitoring
As well as monitoring the systems on the network,
the supervisor will have access to a radiation
environment monitor such as Surrey’s CRE/CEDEX
payload [41, 42]. These instruments are capable of
producing counts of the incident particles on the
spacecraft electronics. When the count rate exceeds
some pre-set threshold, a flag is raised that informs the
supervisor that the environment is hostile.

Fig. 11. (top) Proton Environment Measured by the KITSAT-1
Cosmic-Ray Experiment (CRE) at 1330 km Altitude.
(bottom) S80/T Program Memory Upsets at 1330 km Altitude

For a satellite in low-Earth orbit (LEO), the
probability of getting an SEE may be much higher when
traversing the South-Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) (Figure
10), or when crossing the polar-regions during a solar
particle event. Similarly, for a satellite in geostationary
Earth-orbit (GEO), a normally benign SEE environment
might suddenly become much more severe due to a solar
particle event. Thus, real-time knowledge of the
environment can enable the supervisor to take special,
adaptive, measures in harsh radiation conditions. Device
health checks can be made more often (e.g. increased
washing of memories) and other precautionary measures
can be taken (e.g. the avoidance of read/write operations
on flash memories).
Fault Diagnosis
In addition to regular monitoring of system behaviour,
the supervisor will periodically instigate further
diagnostics by running tests. The type of test employed
depends upon the devices used in the system. Diagnostic

can also be enabled after detecting an erroneous
behaviour.
For processors, a small test program can be run. The
results of the test will be compared with the stored
results and a recovery procedure will be invoked on
mismatch of the results.
In addition to test programs, configuration of SRAM
FPGA devices can be read back and checked against the
configuration data stored in the code store.
In network interfaces erroneous behaviour is usually
caused by an upset in protocol registers or state
machines. For instance, Seidleck et al presents an
example of a soft error in asynchronous request filter
low (ARFL) register, which is a link layer register of
IEEE 1394 (firwire) bus [30]. The function of this
register is to enable reception of asynchronous packets.
When an asynchronous request packet is received, the bit
corresponding to the source ID is examined in ARFL
register. If a SEU turns a bit from 1 to 0, packets with
corresponding source ID will neither be acknowledged
nor be queued. Similarly, the SpaceWire standard
specifies a state machine to hold a sequence of steps for
recovering from link disconnect errors. A SEU on one of
the entries can cause erroneous behaviour and it will not
be evident unless the node experience a link disconnects
error.
As these elements are implemented as user logic and
can be accessed by the programmer. Therefore it can be
a useful measure to read these values periodically and
check against values stored in TMR protected code store.
In addition to packets described in preceding sections,
each interface FPGA will send its critical parameters to
the supervisor.
For memory devices, the output of the EDAC coding
systems can be used to identify the address locations of
errors and thus the faulty device or devices can be
identified. If necessary, test bit patterns can be written
and read back. If a faulty device exhibits permanent
failure, it can be removed from logical memory map.
System Recovery
Once the fault has been identified, the appropriate
recovery method can be invoked. After restoring basic
functionality of the system, the supervisor can use data
stored in the code store to attempt recovery of the state
of the system to that prior to the fault occurring.
In the case of the OBC, for example, this might mean
re-loading the flight software, and process context table,
stack, queues etc., which were written to the code store
in last known good state.
A similar approach would be taken for the payload
computer, although here the internal configuration of the
processor FPGA would also need restoring.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF FAULT DETECTION, DIAGNOSTIC AND RECOVERY
Module
OBC

Payload
Computer

Detection
1. Packet Timeout
2. SEU count of
program memory
exceeded the
threshold
3. Screech Flag
High
Same as the OBC

SSDR

SEUs count higher
than a threshold

Code
Store

1. Upset rate higher
than a threshold
2. Repeated errors
1. Unable to connect
2. Link disconnect
3. Error reports
received via CAN
bus
4. More than
expected packets
received from a
node
5. Packets with
unexpected
lengths

All
Interface
FPGAs

Diagnostic
1. Test program
results do not
match expectation

Detection Capabilities
1. Processor malfunctioning
2. Memory malfunctioning
3. Screech
4. Task Crash
5. Processor hang/lockup

Recovery
1.Reset or power cycling with state
recovery
2. Power cycling with state recovery
3. Reload task and report to ground
4. Processor reset
5. Power cycling and state recovery

In addition to test
programs,
configuration read
back
Isolate affected
memory bank

Same as the OBC + errors in
configuration

Same as the OBC + configuring FPGA
when required

Upset rate indicating a SEFI

Isolate location of
repeated errors

Upsets indicating a SEFI or a
permanent error

Copy contents of the affected memory
device/bank to a redundant one and
reinitializiation of the affected device or
power cycling through the bank
Reset or power cycling.
Report of permanent errors

Diagnostic packets

1.
2.
3.
4.

Non responding node
Erroneous node
Babbling node
Node with incorrect
source address

Bulk memory systems such as the SSDRs would
inevitably lose data, however, provided the individual
banks of memory are not too large, the proportion of
data lost can be kept low. If a SEFI event requires power
cycling of a particular memory bank, then data from
unaffected devices within the memory bank may be
recovered and written to spare memory locations in other
banks before the power is cycled.
With judicious choice of EDAC coding strategy, and
by spreading logical blocks of data over several physical
banks of memory, it may be possible to completely
restore the original data

VII.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Over the last 20 years, COTS technology has been flown
in space systems with a reasonable expectation of
success – as exemplified by Surrey’s 20+ COTS-based
space missions. However, the complexity of COTS
device technology has been increasing and functional
interrupts have become serious threats to reliable COTS
based on-board computing. Detection of SEFIs requires
intelligent monitoring of the device behaviour. Recovery
procedures (there can be more than one) depend on the
cause of the problem and its severity. The question arises
how to recover the affected device quickly and as close

Reset command via CAN or reloading
interface FPGA with protocol registers

as possible to its state prior to the fault event.
In past reports of SEFIs were confined to
microprocessors only. However, this is no longer the
case. SEFIs have been extended to memories as well as
FPGAs. Power cycling requirements associated with
most of the functional interrupts demands for an external
entity to enforce state recovery. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to apply fault detection and recovery at the
system level.
In contrast to traditional mitigation strategies for
SEFIs, which are heavily based on large amount of
redundancy. It will be more efficient in terms of required
resources to explore possible malfunctioning behavior of
a target application and to design a fault tolerant system
to cope with possible faults.
This paper has described a proposed autonomous onboard fault detection and recovery architecture designed
to maximize system availability and information
integrity in presence of functional interrupts.
Work is in progress to implement this architecture.
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